风险规制与专家理性——评布雷耶的《粉碎邪恶循环:面向有效率的风险规制》  

Risk Regulation and Expert's Rationality——Comment on Breyer's Breaking the Vicious Circle:Toward Effective Risk Regulation

作　　者：杨小敏[1] 戚建刚[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学法学院,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《现代法学》2009年第6期168-177,共10页Modern Law Science

基　　金：国家社科基金青年项目"行政应急权力的要素及其制约机制研究"(08CFX015)

摘　　要：布雷耶在《粉碎邪恶循环:面向有效率的风险规制》一书中分析了美国政府在规制那些不起眼的风险过程中所呈现的风险规制议程确定的随意性、规制缺乏连续性等情形。他认为产生这些问题的症结可以归因于一个邪恶循环,即公众对风险的认知、国会的反应以及规制过程的不确定。为打破这一邪恶循环,则需要建立一种以目标为导向的,去政治化的、精英式的"超级专家理性"制度。就我国风险规制而言,由于存在着与美国政府相似的问题,而布雷耶法官所提出的"超级专家理性"制度切中了我国风险规制体系的要害,因此,这项制度对于破解我国风险规制所存在的问题具有重要的启示意义。In his Breaking the Vicious Circle： Toward Effective Risk Regulation, Breyer observes the less-concerned maladies suffered by the uncoordinated US regulators, such as random agenda selection and inconsistency of regulation, ctc, which, in his opinion, are all imputed to the vicious circle, i.e. the public perceptions, Congressional actions and reactions and the uncertainty of regulation. In order to break out from the vicious circle, a super-expert rationality institution should be constituted that is mission-oriented, elitist and de- politicized. As to the risk regulation in China, since the maladies suffered here are similar to those in the USA and the super-expert rationality institution put forth by Breyer is quite to the point of the risk regulation in China, obviously this institution is of significant referential meaning for China to solve her problems in risk regulation.

关 键 词：风险规制 专家理性 超级机构 邪恶循环 

分 类 号：DF41[政治法律—经济法学]