国有股权的替代性投资者保护效应:理论与经验证据  

Alternative protection effects on investors from state-owned equities:theory and economic evidence

作　　者：计小青[1] 曹啸[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学财经研究所,上海200433 [2]上海财经大学金融学院,上海200433

出　　处：《经济学家》2009年第12期48-60,共13页Economist

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70702035);上海市哲学社会科学规划课题(2009BJB030);上海市重点学科建设项目(B802);上海财经大学"211"工程三期项目的资助

摘　　要：在我国转轨时期市场秩序、法律体系和管制制度不完善的制度环境下,标准的投资者保护机制不能有效地发挥作用,而国有控股的股权结构通过支撑外部投资者信心以及控制上市公司内部人的掠夺激励为投资者提供了替代性的保护,从而支持了我国股票市场早期的超常规发展。Under the institutional environment of imperfect market order, legal system and regulation system during the transition period in China, standard mechanism for protecting investors can not play an effective role, but the equity structure of state-owned shares can give alternative protection for investors through building the confidence of outside investors and controlling the insiders predatory incentives so as to support the unusual development of the earlier Chinese stock market.

关 键 词：国有股权 替代性投资者保护 logistic检验 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]