1971年南亚危机与尼克松政府的对策  

The South Asia Crisis in 1971 and the Reaction of the Nixon Administration

作　　者：王琛[1] 王苏礼[2] 

机构地区：[1]郑州大学教育学院,河南郑州450001 [2]中共中央党校国际战略研究所,北京100091

出　　处：《史学月刊》2009年第12期89-97,共9页Journal of Historical Science

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学重大课题攻关项目"冷战时期美国重大外交政策研究"(06JZD0013)的个案研究成果

摘　　要：1971年,巴基斯坦的内部动乱演变为印巴战争与美苏之间的对抗。随着危机的深化,美国政策从最初的中立变为介入,最后公开"偏袒"巴基斯坦。从国际冷战大势、尼克松的全球均势战略、"大国南亚困境"机制、尼克松的情感因素来看,"偏袒"政策不仅是美国保持其南亚利益的需要,更是服务于尼克松的国际战略安排的必然选择。This research is mainly on the background,evolution,outcome,and the causes of the US policy on the South Asia Crisis in 1971.In 1971,the turmoil in East Pakistan broke out,and then evolved the Indo-Pakistan War and the rivalry between the US and the USSR.With the development of the crisis,the US policy changed from neutrality to intervention,and finally,to the ＂tilt＂.Based on the global Cold War,Richard Nixon s strategy of equilibrium,＂the Great Powers’ Dilemma in South Asia＂,Nixon s likes and dislikes to the leaders of India and Pakistan, the author concluded that the ＂tilt＂ policy accords with the US interests in South Asia and Nixon＇s Grand Strategy.

关 键 词：1971年南亚危机 理查德·尼克松 英迪拉·甘地 大国南亚困境 

分 类 号：K153[历史地理—历史学]