对电力市场中发电商的微观行为分析  

Analysis of generation company’s micro-behavior in electricity markets

作　　者：游义刚[1] 周晓阳[2] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学水电学院,湖北武汉430074 [2]华中科技大学数学系,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《电力系统保护与控制》2009年第23期35-40,共6页Power System Protection and Control

摘　　要：对电力市场中发电商的生存环境进行博弈分析,引入对手环境约束曲线的概念,通过研究发电商价格可控区间和市场力的关系,提出市场力信息反馈环的概念,并利用信息反馈环建立了一个猜测函数模型,给出了一个合理的发电商不完全信息学习机制:由于信息匮乏,发电商只能用历史数据估计对手环境约束曲线,并将其利润最大化的决策问题改为追求某种特定目标。最后对算例进行观察和分析,得出结论:市场力是导致电力市场不稳定的最主要因素,它将通过信息反馈环逐步加强。This paper investigates the generation company＇s survival condition from the point of game analyzing. It probes into the internal relationship between control interval and market power of the generation company. So the concept of opponent environment constrain curve and information feedback cycle come forth. And we find a reasonable studying mechanism in case of incomplete information. Because the information is inadequate, the generation company has to estimate its opponent environment constrain curve based on the historical data. Then the generation company＇s target is not the maximal profit but the customized one. At last we can make the conclusion that the market power is the main factor led to the instability of power market. It will be strengthened via the information feedback cycle.

关 键 词：电力市场 博弈 市场力 对手环境约束曲线 信息反馈 不完全信息 

分 类 号：F426.61[经济管理—产业经济]