基于进化博弈模型的商标侵权政府治理探究  

On the Government's Measures against Trademark Infringement Based on an Evolutionary Game Model

作　　者：叶强[1] 李乾贵[2] 

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院博士研究生 [2]南京航空航天大学科技与经济法制研究中心主任、教授、博士生导师,南京210016

出　　处：《中国行政管理》2009年第12期69-72,共4页Chinese Public Administration

摘　　要：商标侵权行为严重危害了公平竞争的市场经济秩序,侵害了商标权利人和消费者的合法权益,被世界各国怒斥为"地下黑色经济"、"现代工业瘟疫"。屡禁不止的商标侵权现象,近年来已经成为我国政府治理的难题。在商标侵权的政府治理中,政府、企业是主要的参与主体。企业是否实施假冒侵权行为,可以看作是政府与企业博弈的结果。构建商标侵权政府监管的博弈模型,可以更好地揭示政企间的策略变化,从中提出更有利于治理商标侵权的政策建议。本文运用进化博弈理论和进化博弈模型作为研究分析的基本路径,深入分析了商标侵权治理中政府与企业之间的长期动态博弈关系,并据此探究和提出了构建完整有效的商标侵权政府监管体系的策略。Trademark infringement has not only jeopardized orderly market that facilitates fair competition, but has also inflicted the legitimate rights and interests of trademarks＇ owners and consumers in accordance with the law. So trademark infringement is viewed by all governments as ＂underground economy＂ and ＂industrial plague＂. Trademark infringement in recent years has become a difficult problem in China. The government and the enterprise are the main participants in the governance of trademark infringement. Whether the implementation of counterfeit happens, can be regarded as the result of the game between governments and enterprises. So the construction of game model can reveal the change in strategy and come up with the better policy proposals. In order to investigate the game between governments and enterprises in the governance of trademark infringement, this paper analyses their respective costs and benefits, and studies the game status by evolutionary game theory. Based on the analysis, this paper puts forward the policies and strategies about the establishment of a complete supervision and regulation system concerning trademark infringement.

关 键 词：进化博弈 商标侵权 政府治理 监管体系 

分 类 号：D923.43[政治法律—民商法学]