考虑需求因素的国际石油市场寡头厂商博弈模型  

Models on the Game of Oligarch Manufacturers in the World Oil Market with Incomplete Information

作　　者：梁琳琳[1,2] 齐中英[1] 

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨工业大学管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150001 [2]云南财经大学国际工商学院,云南昆明650221

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2009年第4期160-162,173,共4页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70673015);技术;政策;管理(TPM)国家哲学社会科学基地资助项目(htscr06t07)

摘　　要：本文根据国际石油市场上石油厂商的产量受需求因素影响以及厂商间产量决策互相影响的事实,在传统的Stackelberg主从博弈模型中引入需求弹性和推测变差变量,建立了能够反映国际石油市场需求弹性变化和厂商间产量决策相互影响关系的产量博弈模型。最后,利用国际石油市场的实际数据,对传统的Stackelberg产量博弈模型与考虑需求弹性和推测变差的产量博弈模型进行了实例比较。结果表明,在相同的市场条件下,由于考虑了需求的变化和竞争者的产量变化,欧佩克在改进的模型中比在传统的Stackelberg模型能生产更多的产量且获利更多,而非欧佩克则获得了较低的产量和收益。Based on the fact that the world oil market is more and more affected by the demand factors, this paper builds an output game model reflecting the movements of demand elasticity. Meanwhile, this paper introduced Conjectural Variation to judge the alternates of other producers with the movements of its own output and choose its own production strategy because of the imperfect information between the producers and the mutual influences of the output decision in the oligopoly market. At last, an example was taken to compare the output and profits between the two models. The results show that OPEC can yield and gain more for its advantage of costs and the first-move advantage than Non-OPEC.

关 键 词：寡头市场 推测变差 需求弹性 产量决策 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]