线性激励、努力程度与国企经营者行为  

Linear Incentive,Effort Level and Behavior of State-Owned Enterprise Manager

作　　者：徐小斌[1] 李传昭[1] 方涌[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2009年第4期178-181,共4页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70602028)

摘　　要：本文分析国企经营者在同时决定努力程度和账面利润时的行为选择,经两阶段不完全信息动态博弈分析发现:存在经营者为阻止竞争者进入而刻意不努力工作以压低企业实际盈利的情况,导致隐性国有资产损失。激励机制在监督机制不健全的情况下无太大意义;要杜绝国有资产隐性损失,除强化监督外还必须给经营者提供足够高的绩效薪酬。This article analysis the behavior selection of state-owned enterprise manager when he should make sure of the paper profit and the effort level at the same time. By the analysis of two-state dynamic game of incomplete information, the manager will be effortless intensively so it can depress the reality-profit in order to prevent the competitors enter. And the implicit lost of state-owned property will happened. Incentive mechanisms has not any effects if the supervision mechanisms unsound. For preventing the implicit lost of state-owned property, besides strengthen supervision mechanisms, the reward of performance should high enough to state - owned enterprise manager.

关 键 词：国有企业 线性激励机制 努力程度 不完全信息动态博弈 

分 类 号：C934[经济管理—管理学]