监管可能性边界的经济学分析——不完全契约的理论视角  

An Economic Analysis of the Border of Regulation——Incomplete Contract Theory Perspective

作　　者：费太安[1] 吴小妹[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学经济学院,北京100872 [2]安徽省社科院江淮论坛杂志社,安徽合肥230051

出　　处：《标准科学》2009年第12期90-96,共7页Standard Science

摘　　要：文章通过对国外主要监管理论发展脉络的梳理,发现目前规制经济学研究的重点是最优规制设计理论。既有规制设计理论包括两个方面:一是从微观角度利用信息经济学和博弈论理论设计激励机制达到最优规制,二是公共强制理论从无序成本与专制成本权衡的角度比较公共管理制度的选择。从不完全契约的角度,探讨了规制经济学中最本质的问题——最优规制的决定,并认为监管国家所有制的本质是在契约不完全下相对私人秩序节约交易费用和监管成本的一种模式选择。In this paper, based on the analysis of the major foreign regulatory theories we found that the optimal regulatory design theory is the most important field. Existing regulatory design theory includes two aspects： first, from the microscopic point of view, design incentive regulation; second, from the cost weighing view, compare public management systems. We reach the most fundamental problem of Regulation Economics-the optimal regulatory decisions and that the essence of the regulation of state ownership is a mode selection of saving transaction costs and regulatory eosts comparing with the private order under the incomplete contract theory.

关 键 词：私人秩序 国家所有制 不完全契约 最优规制 

分 类 号：F091.349[经济管理—政治经济学]