省域经济中产业趋同的博弈分析  

Game Theoretical Analysis on Industry Duplication in Province-Based Economy

作　　者：张刚[1] 王翀[2] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031 [2]淮北煤炭师范学院数学系,安徽淮北235000

出　　处：《西南交通大学学报（社会科学版）》2009年第6期109-113,共5页Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University(Social Sciences)

基　　金：安徽省哲学社会科学规划项目(AHSKF05-06D07)

摘　　要：产业趋同是我国区域经济发展中普遍存在的问题。以两市在高新技术产业和传统产业之间选择的博弈模型为基础,通过不同政策支持的对比分析,可得出如下结论:产业趋同源于各地方政府间经济和政治的综合博弈,因此,只有采取政治和经济两种手段,并通过正式制度安排进行经济上和政治上的激励,才能促使地方政府发展与其资源禀赋相匹配的产业。Industry duplication is a general problem in China＇s regional economy development. Based on a game theoretical model of two cities＇ choosing between high-tech industry and traditional industry and the comparative analysis on their supportive policies, we can make conclusions： Industry duplication originates from the comprehensive game of economy and politics between the regional governments. Only being promoted by economic and political incentives through formal systems, would local governments develop the industries matching with their own resources.

关 键 词：区域经济 产业趋同 省域经济 产业政策 产业布局 

分 类 号：F127[经济管理—世界经济]