强零售商的竞争型闭环供应链回收渠道的决策  

Reverse channel decision for competing closed-loop supply chain with dominant retailer

作　　者：韩小花[1] 薛声家[2] 

机构地区：[1]广东工业大学管理学院,广东广州510520 [2]暨南大学管理学院,广东广州510632

出　　处：《计算机集成制造系统》2009年第11期2247-2253,共7页Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems

基　　金：暨南大学科研基金资助项目(04skzd01);"211工程"资助项目(053240)~~

摘　　要：为研究闭环供应链回收渠道的演化过程,在制造商和零售商双边竞争的市场结构下,应用非合作博弈,对强势零售商领头的闭环供应链回收渠道的决策进行了分析。研究表明,制造商之间和零售商之间的竞争程度共同影响闭环供应链回收渠道的演化结果,而制造商之间的竞争程度对演化结果的影响更大。当制造商都选择直接回收渠道时,闭环供应链具有较低的销售价格和较高的回收率,对消费者和整个社会更有利。Reverse channel decision had great influence on the efficiency of closed-loop supply chain operation. To deal this problem, the reverse channel decision for bilateral competing closed-loop supply chain with dominant retailer was studied based on non-cooperative game. The main results showed that the competition degree between manufactures and retailers influenced the evolution results of reverse channel together, and the competition degree among manufactures had greater influence; when manufactures selected the direct reverse channel, the closed-loop supply chain had lower price and higher recovery rate and was more beneficial to customers and the society.

关 键 词：闭环供应链 双边竞争 回收渠道 强势零售商 非合作博弈 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]