商业化担保的经营困境及扭曲突围:威海案例  

The Dilemma and Distorting Breakout of Commercial Guarantee:Case of Weihai

作　　者：姜明杰[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民银行威海市中心支行,山东威海264200

出　　处：《金融发展研究》2009年第11期36-40,共5页Journal Of Financial Development Research

摘　　要：近来,威海市商业担保公司因居高不下的代偿风险单方面终止与银行的合作,废保弃保并游弋于各金融机构之间。从表面上看,这是一种典型的失信行为,但事实上,其背后反映出银行与担保公司之间存在着严重的风险与收益失衡问题。担保公司无节制放大贷款担保倍数只是这种利益失衡下的非理性经营策略;废保弃保也只是利益失衡的扭曲性还原,但这一被动结局却造成了很大的效率损失。In recent years, because of the high fungible repayment risk the commercial guarantee companies in Weihai terminated cooperation with banks unilaterally, abandoned and quitted guarantee among many banks. Seemingly those were typical discreditable actions of morality risk, but in fact there existed serious unbalance risk and profit between banks and guarantee companies, and the exorbitant guarantee was just the non-rational corporation strategies of guarantee companies. The abandon and quit guarantee behavior of guarantee companies were only the distorted restoration of the unbalanced benefit, but caused large efficiency loss.

关 键 词：商业担保 收益分割 风险分摊 

分 类 号：F832.42[经济管理—金融学]