环境治理制度的逆向选择与矫正  

The Adverse Selection and Remedy of Environmental Governance Institution

作　　者：张秋[1] 

机构地区：[1]河南师范大学经济与管理学院,河南新乡453007

出　　处：《华南师范大学学报（社会科学版）》2009年第6期102-106,共5页Journal of South China Normal University：Social Science Edition

基　　金：国家哲学社会科学基金资助项目"转型期政府行为与政府社会性规制变革研究"(批准号:06BJI023);中国浦东干部学院重点项目"政府社会性规制与企业社会责任契合研究"(批准号:Celapo26)

摘　　要：经济增长与环境保护交织共生,环境治理需要良好的制度设计与安排,而制度的安排要建立在信息对称、能够有效发挥激励与约束功能的基础上,否则政府所制定的各种环境治理措施未必能达到预期的效果。我国环境治理制度安排存在逆向选择问题是导致环境治理效果不理想的重要症结所在。进行制度创新是实现环境资源与经济社会协调可持续发展的理性选择。Economic increase and environmental protection are interrelated and mutually promote. The administration of environment depends greatly on a well-designed system,which,in turn,is based on the symmetry of information and the system's functions as an incentive as well as an controller. Otherwise,the measures taken by the government to protect the environment cannot be as effective as expected. The adverse selection of environmental governance institutions is an important factor that causes environmental condition of our country to become deteriorating. Thus,carrying out institution innovation can be regarded as a correct and rational choice to achieve sustainable harmonious development for environmental resources,economy and society.

关 键 词：环境治理 制度安排 逆向选择 产权绩效 

分 类 号：F205[经济管理—国民经济]