管理者可信行为对员工激励作用的实验研究  

The Employee Incentive Effect of Managerial Trustworthy Behavior:An Experimental Research

作　　者：万迪昉[1] 罗进辉[1] 赵建锋[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,西安710049

出　　处：《管理科学》2009年第6期46-55,共10页Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70572039,70121001)~~

摘　　要：管理者可信行为作为管理者的一种意志行为,能够建立和增强员工对管理者的信任,激励员工提高其努力水平,进而提高个人绩效和组织绩效。运用实验经济学方法,通过设计事前激励契约和惩罚契约两种薪酬契约分别反映管理者实施可信行为和实施不可信行为的实验环境,研究检验管理者可信行为对具有不同互惠倾向的员工的激励作用和效率。实验结果表明,管理者实施可信行为能得到比不实施可信行为更高的员工努力水平和收益。在管理者实施可信行为的情况下,具有较高正互惠倾向的员工将付出比具有较低正互惠倾向的员工更高的努力水平;在管理者实施不可信行为的情况下,具有较高负互惠倾向的员工将付出比具有较低负互惠倾向的员工更低的努力水平。As a kind of managers＇ will actions, managerial trustworthy behavior can Set up and enhance employee＇s trust on the management, and thus motivate them to work harder and improve their individual performance and organization performance. Using economic experimental research methods, this study designs two kinds of compensation contracts, advance incentive contact and punishment contract, to reflect managers＇ trustworthy behavior and untrustworthy behavior respectively. Then it analyzes the incentive effects of managerial trustworthy behavior on reciprocal employees. The experimental results indicate that, by implementing trustworthy behavior, managers will get harder work from employees and thus much more income. Moreover, facing managerial trustworthy behavior, employees with higher positive reciprocity trend will exert higher effort level; and facing managerial untrustworthy behavior, employees with higher negative reciprocity trend will exert much less effort.

关 键 词：管理者可信行为 员工努力水平 互惠 实验研究 

分 类 号：F240[经济管理—劳动经济]