村镇银行──两种金融利益模式的互补形态  

Village Banks──Financial Interests of Two Complementary Patterns

作　　者：王利军[1] 宋记锁[1] 

机构地区：[1]河北经贸大学法学院,河北石家庄050061

出　　处：《唐山师范学院学报》2009年第6期65-67,共3页Journal of Tangshan Normal University

摘　　要：农村金融制度作为农村经济发展中最为重要的资本要素配置制度成为农村经济改革中的一个焦点。在金融危机的大背景下,农村愈发需要金融的支持。但是作为"供给先行"模式的正规金融和作为"需求跟进"模式的民间金融都存在着很多的问题。村镇银行——两种模式的融合形态,集合了现代金融先进的管理经验和民间的资金优势,并利用"村庄信任"特点能够最大限度地克服信息不对称,从而降低信贷的风险。Rural financial system reform of the rural economy as the most important capital allocation system has become a focus point. Under the context of financial crisis, the rural areas need more financial support. But as a ＂supply-led＂ model of the formal financial and as a ＂demand-following＂ model of Non-formal financial there are a lot of problems. Village banks, the integration patterns of two models, collect modern finance-managing experience and the private sector capital. Making use of ＂trust in villages＂ feature can overcome max-information asymmetry, thereby reducing the credit risk.

关 键 词：村镇银行 金融利益 具体表现 

分 类 号：F830.34[经济管理—金融学]