增强Zhong-Yang协议中执行者输入的私密性  

Enhancement of confidentiality of executors’inputs in Zhong-Yang protocol

作　　者：叶建伟[1] 焦绪录[2] 张永铮[3] 

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨工业大学计算机科学与技术学院,哈尔滨150001 [2]国家计算机网络应急技术处理协调中心,北京100029 [3]中国科学院计箅技术研究所,北京100190

出　　处：《哈尔滨工业大学学报》2009年第10期82-85,168,共5页Journal of Harbin Institute of Technology

基　　金：国家重点基础研究发展规划资助项目(2005CB321806);国家自然科学基金资助项目(60703014)

摘　　要：为了进一步提高Zhong-Yang协议在恶意环境中对移动代码执行者输入的私密性保护,使其能抵御恶意发起者进行的错误线密钥探测攻击,提出了一种可验证的倍增子电路,并用它来扩展Zhong-Yang协议中的加密电路.扩展的协议利用倍增子电路来代替执行者的输入线以抵御错误线秘钥探测攻击,并利用Jarecki和Shmatikov的带承诺加密电路构造技术和第三方质疑的零知识证明协议来保证子电路构造的正确性.分析表明:改进后的Zhong-Yang协议在多于2/3的服务器是诚实的情况下能同时抵御恶意服务器的篡改线密钥攻击和恶意发起者的错误线密钥探测攻击,仍然满足移动代码环境的非交互要求,且增加的通信和计算复杂度是多项式时间的.改进后协议能彻底保证恶意的移动代码环境中代码执行者输入的私密性.In order to prevent the fault wire-key probing attacks from the malicious mobile code generators for enhancing the confidentiality of executors＇ inputs in Zhong-Yang protocol, a verifiable multiplying subsidiary circuit is proposed and used to extend the garbled circuit in Zhong-Yang protocol. The extended protocol replaces executors＇ input-wires with the multiplying subsidiary circuits for resisting fault wire-key probing attacks, and ensures the correctness of the construction of the subsidiary circuit by the committed garbled circuit technology of Jarecki and Shmatikov and the third-party challenged zero-knowledge proof protocols. The analyses show that, when more than two-thirds of the third-party servers are honest, the extended protocol can prevent the tampering wire-key attacks of the malicious third-party servers and the fault wire-key probing attacks of the malicious generators simuhaneously, meet the non-interactive request of mobile code environment, and add polynomial communication and computation complexity. The extended protocol ensures the complete confidentiality of executors＇ inputs in malicious mobile code environment.

关 键 词：移动代码 加密电路 私密性 承诺 恶意环境 

分 类 号：TP309[自动化与计算机技术—计算机系统结构]