不对称信息下逆向供应链定价分析与对策  

Price Decision Analysis and Strategy for Reverse Supply Chain Based on Game Theory under Asymmetry Information

作　　者：邱海永[1] 周晶[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学工程管理学院,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2009年第6期14-18,共5页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70571033)

摘　　要：以博弈论为研究方法,对由零售商和制造商组成的逆向供应链的定价问题进行研究,通过分析在回收成本信息对称和信息不对称情况下逆向供应链中制造商和零售商的定价策略,得出了在信息不对称情况下,制造商承担更大的风险。因此制造商需要防范回收成本信息不对称带来的风险,文章进一步给出了制造商的信息甄别合同,通过合同制造商可以降低由回收成本信息不对称带来的风险。This paper studies the pricing of the reverse supply chain composed of one retailer and one manufacturer based on the game theory. By analyzing the pricing strategy of the retailer and the manufacturer in the reverse supply chain when the information of recycling cost is symmetry and asymmetry, the author concludes that the manufacturer runs more risks when the information is asymmetry. Therefore the manufacturer needs to guard a- gainst risks associated with asymmetric information. And this paper further gives the manufacturer＇ s screening contract which reduces the manufacturer＇ s risk.

关 键 词：逆向供应链 定价 STACKELBERG博弈 不对称信息 信息甄别 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]