生产契约对农户心理的影响:政府鼓励与产量选择  

The Psychological Effect of Production Contract to Farmer:Government Encouragement and Choice of Production Quantity

作　　者：赵立泉[1] 徐娜[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津科技大学经济与管理学院,天津300222

出　　处：《现代财经（天津财经大学学报）》2009年第12期77-81,共5页Modern Finance and Economics：Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：国内外学者已经在货币危机和行为经济学领域详细的探讨了在信息不对称条件下政府政策无法实现最初目的的原因。本文从认知偏差角度,对政府在鼓励烤烟生产的"边际奖罚政策"实施的低效率方面进行了理论分析。笔者发现在特定的生产契约条件下,面对同等收益和损失时获得的心理效用不同,是政府的"边际奖罚"政策无法实现预期效果的重要原因;同时,农户对质量控制的努力程度、"边际奖罚"额度的大小、农民(生产者)的相关预期也对政策实施的效果有一定影响。In the researching area of currency crisis and prospect theory, many authors have been discussed the problem that policies from government can not reach original goal in information asymmetrical condition. Based on on--the--spot investigation in H county, author analyze the low efficiency of local government＇s policy in stimulating tobacco production theoretically. We found because facing the same amount of changing in income and loss, human will experience different amount of utility changing, so ＂marginal Award/penalty＂ policy may reach the low efficiency when implementing. Also some other factors can influence its efficiency.

关 键 词：生产契约 认知偏差 烤烟生产 

分 类 号：F124.3[经济管理—世界经济] F713.3