结构实在论能解决科学实在论的问题吗?  

Will Structural Realism Solve the Problems for Scientific Realism?

作　　者：陈刚[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学哲学系

出　　处：《哲学研究》2009年第12期75-81,92,共8页Philosophical Research

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学基金一般项目"意识科学研究前沿的哲学问题"(编号07JA720004);加尔文学院的John Templeton Post-Doc Fellowship的支持

摘　　要：作为科学实在论的最新发展形式，结构实在论占据了当代英美哲学认识论研究的中心，也代表了当代英美哲学研究的最新发展动向。就非实体实在论而言，国内学术界已经有关于关系实在论（参见罗嘉昌；胡新和）和形式实在论（参见陈刚）的研究工作。从字面上来看，关系、结构和形式可以是同一个内容，The paper first summarizes the context of problems for scientific realism,then,provides a brief introduction of the three versions of structural realism,i.e.,the epistemic version by John Worrall,the ontic version by James Ladyman and Steven French,and the third version by Tian Yu Cao.Besides the crossfire among themselves,the author argues that,Worrall's representation of scientific development as a continuous and cumulative process in terms of structural knowledge is not true of the history of science;French and Ladyman's notion of structure without matter is not sound;Cao's ontological synthesis is too optimistic,abstract and dogmatic.While Putnam's meta-induction is a weak argument,Kuhn's ontological discontinuity is still a real problem at large.

关 键 词：科学实在论 结构 哲学研究 认识论研究 关系实在论 学术界 

分 类 号：B0-0[哲学宗教—马克思主义哲学] N02[哲学宗教—哲学理论]