多物品二次报价拍卖机制研究  

Research on Twice Chances Multiunit Auction Mechanism

作　　者：周蓉[1] 王徐[1] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院,上海200433

出　　处：《复旦学报（自然科学版）》2009年第6期713-719,共7页Journal of Fudan University：Natural Science

基　　金：教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划资助项目(NCET-06-0361)

摘　　要：在一次报价拍卖模型的基础上建立了多物品二次报价拍卖动态模型,用逆向递归法证明得出二次报价拍卖下竞拍者的最优报价策略和拍卖商的平均期望收益;并且将二次报价拍卖应用于上海私车额度拍卖,测算了牌照发放数量、竞拍者数量和风险偏好对于中标价和政府平均期望收益的影响.A model on dynamic multiunit twice chances muhiunit auction on the basis of one chance auction is established. The model shows the bidders＇ optimal bidding strategy as well as the auctioneers＇ expected profit in twice chances multiunit auctions. Furthermore, the twice chances multiunit auction is applied to Shanghai cars license auction and the influence of the number of licenses emitted, the number of bidders and bidders＇ risk preference on the accepted bid price and the government＇s average expected profit are analyzed.

关 键 词：多物品拍卖 二次报价 车牌拍卖 

分 类 号：F724.59[经济管理—产业经济]