团体贷款中商业银行—中小企业贷款行为的动态博弈仿真分析  

A Study on Commercial Banks-SMES Dynamic Game Simulation of Group Lending

作　　者：熊熊[1] 武栋才[1] 张永杰[1] 张今[2] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理学院,天津300072 [2]天津财经大学商学院,天津300222

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2009年第6期661-666,共6页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70603021);中国科学院自动化研究所复杂系统与智能科学重点实验室开放课题(20080107)

摘　　要：为了解决中小企业贷款的担保问题,同一个工业园区或一个产业链条上企业间的担保贷款,即团体贷款就成为解决问题的一种方式。利用动态博弈模型,采用仿真的方法对团体贷款中影响银企贷款行为的因素进行了研究,得出通过企业的动态学习,均衡下的企业策略随着社会惩罚和外部惩罚的变动而变动。当外部惩罚足够严厉时,这时的企业策略选择不仅仅只比较团体内部各参与人收益大小,还要考虑同团体中其他个体进行比较。Enterprises in an industrial park or an industry chain applying loans to banks as groups in which the members providing mutual security to each other has become a way to solve the problem of the lack of enough guarantee. Based on dynamic game model under complete information, this paper does some re-search on factors which have some impact on SMES＇ behavior of group lending using simulation method. The enterprises＇ strategy under equilibrium changes as the social and outside punishments change through dynamic learning. When the outside punishment is severe enough, the enterprises will not only comparethe income with participant within group but also with other groups. The cooperation strategy of enterprises is the best strategy of whole enterprises participate in group Lending.

关 键 词：贷款 计算实验金融 团体贷款 动态博弈 

分 类 号：F830.5[经济管理—金融学]