标准竞争的主导性预期与联盟及福利效应分析  

Dominating expectations and standard alliances in standard competition and its welfare effects

作　　者：骆品亮[1] 殷华祥[1] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院,上海200433

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2009年第6期1-11,共11页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划资助项目(NCET-06-0361);上海市曙光计划资助项目(07SG10);复旦大学"211"三期重点项目(211XK06)

摘　　要：随着全球网络经济的迅猛发展,网络标准竞争策略及其有效性已引起产业组织理论研究的重视.在直接网络外部性的研究框架中,消费者预期对标准竞争均衡具有重要影响,而在间接网络外部性下,标准供应商的预期对均衡也会产生重要影响.构建了具有间接网络外部性的标准竞争动态博弈模型,分析主导性预期及标准联盟对标准竞争均衡的影响及其福利效应.研究发现:哪种预期成为主导性预期取决于消费者是否存在策略性延迟购买;标准供应商可以通过组建标准联盟来影响强制性标准的选择,进而影响消费者预期;消费者预期越准确,策略性延迟的福利损失越小;但是,在一定条件下,标准联盟将导致更多的消费者延迟购买,导致福利损失.研究结果可用于解释我国数字电视领域标准竞争的事实.With the rapid development of worldwide network economy, strategies and efficiency of competition of network standard have been paid much attention. The competition of network industry has exceeded the traditional competition of cost and market, and it goes to be standard competition. This article constructs a two- period game model to analyzes the impact of expectations of consumers and manufactures on the equilibrium of standard competition. Based on the above analysis, this article explores the competitive effects and welfare impact of standard alliances, and proposes policy suggestions.

关 键 词：标准竞争 策略性延迟 标准联盟 主导性预期 

分 类 号：F062.5[经济管理—政治经济学]