中日石油进口贸易博弈分析及对策研究  

Game Theory Analysis and Countermeasures on Oil Import Trade between China and Japan

作　　者：何小洲[1] 杜辉[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《重庆大学学报（社会科学版）》2009年第6期13-18,共6页Journal of Chongqing University(Social Science Edition)

摘　　要：对于同为世界上重要的石油消费国和进口国的中国和日本两国而言,获得稳定的石油进口保障对于国家安全具有举足轻重的作用。然而,两国在石油进口来源上大部分重叠,并存在类似的石油安全战略,获得地缘上临近的俄罗斯所拥有的丰富油气资源是中日两国获得石油供给的最佳选择。文章在进行相关分析与博弈分析的基础上,指出中日石油进口贸易之间的博弈并非一个静态的零和博弈,而是一个动态的、不断变化发展的博弈过程,同时提出中国石油进口贸易的相关政策建议。As the important oil consuming and importing countries, it is essential for China and Japan to get stable oil importing resources. However, the oil resource and oil security strategies of these two countries are very similar. The best choice for them to gain abundant oil resources is from Russia, which is located nearby. Based on the relativity analysis and the game theory analysis, the authors point out that it is not a static zero-sum game between China and Japan on oil import trade, but a dynamic and constantly changing game progress, The relative policy suggestions is also given in this paper.

关 键 词：石油进口贸易 相关系数 博弈分析模型 政策建议 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]