基于博弈论的装备采购定价激励模型  

Incentive Pricing Model for Equipment Acquisition Based on Game Theory

作　　者：张涛[1,2] 曹孟谊[1] 欧渊[1] 

机构地区：[1]军械工程学院装备指挥与管理系,河北石家庄050003 [2]66471部队,内蒙古呼和浩特010020

出　　处：《装甲兵工程学院学报》2009年第6期20-22,39,共4页Journal of Academy of Armored Force Engineering

摘　　要：不同的定价方式和定价参数的选择对于承包商会起到不同程度的激励作用。为提高装备采购效益,在承包商追求效用最大化假设的基础上,建立了装备采购完全信息动态博弈模型。对价格、成本、承包商努力程度和承包商效用之间的关系进行了研究,证明了成本分担和固定价格的定价方式能够有效激励承包商提高自身努力水平降低成本,并提出了2种定价方式的参数定量计算方法。The efforts made by a contractor are mainly determined by the pricing model and pricing parameters.To improve the benefits of the equipment expenditures,this paper establishes a full-information dynamic game model for the equipment acquisition based on maximum assumption of contractor＇s utility.This paper studies the relation among price,cost,contractor＇s efforts and contractor＇s utility,and shows that cost-sharing and fixed-price pricing model can encourage contractors to make efforts and effectively reduce the manufacture cost.Also this paper offers two ways of calculating the parameters of the pricing models.

关 键 词：博弈论 装备采购 定价方式 承包商 激励模型 

分 类 号：E257[军事—军事理论] C939[经济管理—管理学]