组织协调博弈与合作的形成  

The Coordination Game and Formation of Cooperation in Organization

作　　者：饶志明[1] 

机构地区：[1]华侨大学经济与金融学院,福建泉州362021

出　　处：《科学决策》2009年第12期84-91,共8页Scientific Decision Making

摘　　要：组织内部合作规范的形成是组织理论和实践关注的一个焦点。但纯粹基于支付比较分析的演化博弈论在解释组织协调失灵问题时存在着明显的缺陷,解决协调失灵问题需要另辟思路。本文从各种协调机制之间协同演化的角度阐述提高合作者配对概率和创造合作形成的组织学习环境的重要性,这种制度协同演化的思路对解决组织内部合作形成的问题更加切合实际,对于演化博弈论如何克服弱点和发挥优势也具有理论意义。The problem about formation of cooperative norms in organization is a focus to organizational theory and practices. However, evolutionary game theory （EGT） has evident defects in interpreting the problem of organizational coordination failure, because its interpretations are only based on payoffs comparative analysis, so it requires a new thinking to resolve this problem. In this paper, from a view of co - evolution among different coordination mechanisms, the significance of organizational learning environment to increasing the matching probability among cooperators and creating cooperation in organization is expounded. This thinking based on co - evolution of institutions is a more realistic solution to resolve problem of formation of cooperation in organization, and also has a theoretical meaning to EGT how to play its advantage and overcome its shortcoming.

关 键 词：合作 博弈 协同演化 组织 

分 类 号：C936[经济管理—管理学]