基于机构利益的中国股市IPO抑价实证研究  

Empirical Study of Chinese IPO Underpricing Based on Institutional Interests

作　　者：何剑[1] 

机构地区：[1]广东商学院财务处,广东广州510320

出　　处：《广东商学院学报》2009年第6期72-76,共5页Journal of Guangdong University of Business Studies

基　　金：广东省社会科学基金项目(06E16)

摘　　要：以我国股市开始以来到2005年底的1332家所有IPO新股为研究样本,分四个阶段对机构利益与IPO的抑价关系进行考察。研究发现:交易量放大的"佣金理论"在中国股票市场得到完全体现,承销商通过IPO发行中的法人配售机制输送利益给相关的利益共同体的现象是存在的,同时还存在承销商通过IPO抑价为其发行人创造未来再融资的条件和便利的现象;但保荐人制度下IPO抑价并不高,说明避免法律责任理论在中国股市尚不成立。By using all the 1332 IPOs from the start of China＇ s stock market to the end of 2005 as research samples, this paper examines the relationship between institutional interests and IPO underpricing in four phases. The results show that the commission theory about the underwriters＇ incentive to increase trading volume do exist in China＇ s stock market. There also exists such phenomena that underwriters convey interests to the associated interest-sharing group members via issuing allocation function in IPO, and that the underwriters facilitate future refinancing for issuers via IPO underpricing. But, under the sponsor system, the ratio of Chinese IPO un- derpricing is not large, which indicates that lawsuit-avoidance has not yet emerged in China＇ s stock market.

关 键 词：IPO抑价 法人配售 机构利益 发行 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学]