股东和管理层的权力博弈与会计信息质量——来自中国证券市场的经验证据  

The Game between Shareholders Power and Managerial Power and Accounting Information Quality

作　　者：黎文靖[1] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学管理学院,广东广州510632

出　　处：《暨南学报（哲学社会科学版）》2009年第6期114-123,共10页Jinan Journal(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目<股权分置改革与资本市场动机盈余管理研究>(批准号:70802024)

摘　　要：经验证据表明,对于非国有上市公司,当公司的股权集中度较低时,管理层权力对会计稳健性具有显著的负向影响,股东权力的上升会增强会计稳健性;当公司股权集中度中等时,股东权力对会计稳健性呈现显著的负向影响作用,管理层权力对会计稳健性无显著影响;当公司股权集中度较高时,股东权力对会计稳健性具有显著的负向影响,而随着管理层权力的增强,会计稳健性提高。对于国有上市公司,在不同的股权集中度下,管理层权力对会计稳健性均无显著影响,股东权力对会计稳健性则维持负向的影响作用。The article analyzes the influence of shareholders and management of Chinese listed companies on the accounting information quality according to their different ownership structures. Empirical evidence illustrates that,at the low level of share concentration,the power of management has negative effect on accounting stability,while the increase of the power of shareholders enhances accounting stability for non-listed state-owned enterprises. With medium level of share concentration,the power of shareholders demonstrates negative impait on accounting stability,but the power of management has no effect on accounting conservatism. Based on high level of share concentration,the power of shareholders throws negative influences on accounting conservatism,while with the improvement of the power of management,accounting conservatism increases. However,for state-owned listed companies,management power has no significant effect on conservatism regardless of the level of share concentration,while the power of shareholders has negative influence.

关 键 词：管理层权力 股东权力 第一大股东 股权集中度 会计稳健性 

分 类 号：F930.91[经济管理]