我国医疗服务供方准入规制有效性的博弈分析  

A Game Analysis on the Effectiveness of Chinese Medical Service Supplier Entrance Regulation

作　　者：王晓玲[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学社会保障研究中心,武汉430072 [2]深圳大学经济学院,广东深圳518060

出　　处：《软科学》2009年第12期63-68,共6页Soft Science

基　　金：教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目(03JZD0022)

摘　　要：从经济学角度,运用博弈论的研究方法,通过建立一个以医院服务品质为内生变量的模型,对两种市场形态下定点医院的行为进行分析,得出结论:医保供方的准入规制会导致效率损失,并对制度的改进提出建议。By theory of game,this paper constructs a model,which considers medical quality as its endogenous variable.Then it analyzes the regulation effectiveness of each fixed-point hospital in the least competitive situation and the most competitive situation.Resutls show that the entrance regulation of DHS is likely to bring quality damage.In the end,it brings some improved advice about medicare system

关 键 词：医疗供方 准入规制 医疗品质 

分 类 号：R197[医药卫生—卫生事业管理]