不确定概率下安全控制博弈分析  

Game Analysis on Security Control under Uncertain Probability

作　　者：冯领香[1] 朱孔国[1] 李书全[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津财经大学商学院

出　　处：《中国安全科学学报》2009年第11期52-55,共4页China Safety Science Journal

基　　金：天津市哲学社会科学规划重点项目(tjgl08-010)

摘　　要：为了研究建筑工程中的安全控制问题,建立不确定概率下施工企业与建筑工人之间的博弈模型,讨论博弈参与方的安全控制行为选择与收益矩阵中经济参数之间的关系。研究表明:施工企业和建筑工人的安全控制行为选择受多种因素的影响,包括双方对工程建设过程中的安全概率估计、工程顺利完成之后的收益、安全控制成本、发生事故之后的损失及赔偿以及对方的策略选择,继而建立了博弈双方策略选择与安全概率估计及经济参数之间的关系。Game theory model between construction enterprise and construction worker under uncertain probability is founded to study the construction safety control. The relation between safety behavior and economic parameters is discussed. Analysis on this model shows that the safety behaviors of construction enterprise and workers are affected by many factors, such as the assessment of safety probability, the profits, the cost of security control, the accident loss and compensation, and the strategy of the opponent. Finally, the relations among strategy selection of both sides, assessment of safety probability and economic parameters are established.

关 键 词：博弈 安全控制 经济参数 不确定概率 策略选择 

分 类 号：X913.3[环境科学与工程—安全科学]