考虑质量提升的供应链质量成本分担合同研究  

Supply Chain Quality Cost-sharing Contract Research Considering Pushing Quality Improvement

作　　者：熊中楷[1] 刘芳兵[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2009年第12期100-103,共4页East China Economic Management

摘　　要：文章研究在理性的制造商和供应商组成的二级供应链中,考虑有质量风险和提高质量水平情况下怎样来设计出最优的供应链质量成本分担合同。在合同设计的过程中,考虑了三种信息不对称情况下(即:供应商信息隐匿而制造商可观测、制造商信息隐匿而供应商可观测、双方信息均隐匿三种情况)的道德风险问题,以及在各自情况下,合同分担参数如何取值使得供求双方的行动同信息对称情况下的供应链最优解一致。所得的结论对指导当前供应链的有效运作有着较好的实际意义和参考价值。This paper studies the supply chain with only a manufacturer and a suppler, When the quality risks and improvement are considered at the same time, how to design optimal supply chain quality cost -sharing contract. In the contract design process, we consider three Asymmetric Information moral hazard, ie, Suppliers＇ information can be concealed and manufacturers＇ can be observed, the manufacturers＇ can be concealed and suppliers＇ information can be observed, the two sides have both concealed information. As well as in their respective condition, how we calculate the parameters＇ value in order to reach same optimal solution. The conclusions of this paper have a good practical significance and value in guidance of the efficiently operation of the supply chain.

关 键 词：供应链 质量风险 提高质量 非对称信息 合同研究 

分 类 号：F50[经济管理—产业经济]