企业人力资本专用性投资研究——基于博弈论视角  

The Research on the Specific Investment of Human Capital in the View of Game Theory

作　　者：左双喜[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖北大学商学院,湖北武汉430062

出　　处：《西安财经学院学报》2010年第1期55-60,共6页Journal of Xi’an University of Finance & Economics

摘　　要：从影响人力资本专用性投资的因素出发,构建了企业所有者与员工在人力资本专用性投资方面的博弈模型。研究发现,在信息不对称条件下,企业实施三项贴水措施,可促使企业所有者与员工双方,均能够从人力资本专用性投资中所获得的长期利益大大高于其由欺诈而获得的短期利益。这样,在促使双方博弈达到均衡的同时,亦加速了企业人力资本的专用性投资。Considering the factors influencing the investment of specialty of human capital, the paper constructs the game model between business owner and employees. The study found that in the condition of information asymmetry, firm taking the strategy of 3 kinds of premium will enable firm itself and staffs to benefit more in the long term than winning the short - term interests through fraud. Therefore, this brings the two sides to reach a balanced game and the enterprise - specific human capital investment at the same time.

关 键 词：博弈论视角 企业人力资本 专用性投资 三项贴水 

分 类 号：F240[经济管理—劳动经济]