妥协可接受的随机合作对策的妥协值  

Compromise Value of Compromise Admissible Stochastic Cooperative Game

作　　者：刘微[1] 李靖[2] 冯英杰[1] 

机构地区：[1]河北化工医药职业技术学院基础部,河北石家庄050021 [2]石家庄铁路职业技术学院信息工程系,河北石家庄050041

出　　处：《石家庄铁道学院学报（自然科学版）》2009年第4期71-74,共4页Journal of Shijiazhuang Railway Institute

基　　金：河北省自然科学基金资助项目(A2005000301)

摘　　要：以妥协可接受的NTU对策的妥协值和TU对策的τ值为基础,将妥协值的性质推广到随机合作对策的模型中,从而得到具有非空核心的、妥协可接受随机合作对策的妥协值是可期望得到的最大支付和最小权之间的协调值,且妥协值介于两者之间。This paper extends the notion of the compromise value which is based on the compromise value for NTU games and τ -value for TU games. It is shown that the nonempty cores of compromise admissible stochastic cooperative game is bounded by the utopia payoffs and minimal rights, and that the compromise value for stochastic cooperative game is compromise between the utopia payoffs and minimal rights.

关 键 词：随机合作对策 妥协值 支付 核心 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]