高管薪酬激励过度了吗——基于边际递减效应与中国民营上市公司的研究  

Is Top Management Compensation Incentive Excessive? Based on Marginal Diminishing Effects and Chinese Private Listed Companies

作　　者：左晶晶[1] 唐跃军[1] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院,上海200433

出　　处：《商业经济与管理》2010年第1期61-68,共8页Journal of Business Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70802015);上海市哲学社会科学规划青年课题(2008EJB002);上海市教育发展基金会晨光计划项目(2008CG09)

摘　　要：在隐性激励大量存在的中国市场,上市公司高管看起来显著较低的薪酬亦可能导致一定程度的过度激励。文章考虑到民营企业在高管薪酬激励方面的特异性,选择2001-2007年中国民营上市公司的经验证据,具体讨论高管薪酬激励对企业业绩的影响。有别于先前多数有关高管薪酬激励的研究文献,文章不仅清晰展现了高管薪酬激励存在一定的滞后效应;而且进一步证实高管薪酬激励存在较为显著的边际递减效应和过度激励,即民营企业高管薪酬激励与企业业绩之间在表现为线性正相关关系的同时呈现出左低右高的倒"U"形关系。In Chinese market with great implicit incentives, apparently low compensation of top management may still lead to excessive incentive. The paper, based on the special aspects of compensation incentive for top management of private enterprises and with evidences from Chinese private listed companies from 2001 to 5007, discusses the impacts of compensation incentive for top management on corporate performance. Different from most of other former researches, the paper not only clearly shows delayed effect of compensation incentive for top management, but also finds significant marginal diminishing effect and excessive incentive of compensation incentive for top management which results in an inverted U-shaped relationship with a lower left wing and higher right wing between compensation incentive for top management and corporate performance.

关 键 词：边际递减效应 过度激励 滞后效应 隐性激励 

分 类 号：F244[经济管理—劳动经济] F404[经济管理—国民经济]