基于信号传递博弈的融资租赁市场均衡分析  

The Financial Leasing Market Equilibrium analysis Based on Signaling Game

作　　者：王冀宁[1] 陈庭强[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京工业大学,江苏南京210009

出　　处：《金融理论与实践》2010年第1期25-28,共4页Financial Theory and Practice

基　　金：2009年度江苏省软科学基金项目"企业自主创新中的投资偏差和风险研究"(编号:08SJD7900051);第四十二批中国博士后科学基金"外部性约束;认知偏差与中国农户贷款困境研究"(编号:20070420480)的资助

摘　　要：融资租赁作为一种新的金融工具,已被诸多经济发达的国家普遍采用,并成为其金融市场的重要组成部分。在我国中小企业融资难的情况下,融资租赁也不失为中小企业融资的一种可供选择的方式。本文借鉴"斯宾塞劳动力市场信号传递模型",构建一个符合我国中小企业融资市场实际状况的融资租赁市场调控模型。研究结果表明:融资租赁市场的均衡既取决于承租方的装裱成本,也取决于不同类型承租方的租金差异、低营运能力承租方的项目投入的成功率及低营运能力承租方的信用程度(即履约率)。As a new financial instrument, finance leases has been generally adopted by many developed countries, and become an important part of their financial markets. In the case of financing difficulties of China＇s small and medium-sized enterprises, finance lease will be an alternative approach for China＇s small and medium-sized enterprises financing. This article refer to the ＂Spencer＇s labor market signaling model＂ to build a finance leases market regulation model that accord with the practical situation of China＇s small and medium-sized enterprises financing market. The results show that financing leasing market equilibrium depends both on the cost of the lessee of the whitewash, but also on differences between different types of tenant rents, low operating capacity lessee＇s success rate of project inputs and lessee＇s credit rating.

关 键 词：融资租赁 信号传递博弈 承租方 出租方 均衡分析 

分 类 号：F830.9[经济管理—金融学]