基于博弈论的法律责任与审计师定价策略  

Legal Responsibility and Auditors' Price Strategy Based on Play Game

作　　者：毛敏[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京财经大学会计学院,江苏南京210046

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2010年第1期66-69,共4页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：南京财经大学校级课题<我国注册会计师行业监管研究>(C0803)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：以完美贝叶斯均衡赛局模型,研究审计师的法律责任是否会影响审计师的初次审计定价策略。研究发现,若考虑审计师的法律责任,当初次审计合约的签约与前期审计服务质量无直接关联性时,审计定价策略会产生分离均衡;当初次审计合约的签约与前期审计服务质量有直接关联性时,会产生混同均衡。The paper makes research of the impact from the legal responsibility of auditors on the first audit price strategy by the perfect Bayes game model. We found that if it was the first contract between auditors and client, the price strategy has no connection with auditor＂ service quality. But if we think about legal responsibility, it will not be the same before, and separating equilibrium comes. If we sign current contract that has direct connection with audit quality, it comes pooling equilibrium price strategy.

关 键 词：定价策略 分离均衡 混同均衡 法律责任 

分 类 号：F239[经济管理—会计学]