高技术企业联盟所有权配置动态博弈与实证研究  

Game Model and Empirical Study on Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights in High-Tech Enterprise Alliance

作　　者：孙耀吾[1] 张平[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学工商管理学院,湖南长沙410082

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2010年第1期93-98,共6页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(06BJY022)

摘　　要：高技术企业通过联盟可以获得技术诀窍,分享合作剩余,但所有权配置对联盟合作绩效产生重要影响。不完全合同框架下的动态博弈模型与实证分析表明,拥有控制权是企业披露诀窍的基本条件,企业的诀窍披露和努力投入决策会因所有权结构的不同发生改变,这对探索联盟科学治理途径,提高企业合作创新绩效具有重要启示和指导意义。High-tech enterprise in alliances can get technology know--how and share the collaboration surplus, and allocation of ownership has a great influence on the cooperation effectiveness of alliance. Dynamic Game Model based on incomplete contracts approach analysis and the practical analysis show that control of property rights is the essential for the enterprises to disclo- sure know--how, and decisions of know-how disclosure ＆ invest effort would be changed according to the ownership structures. The findin ploring alliance governance approaches and gs im have significant instruction and implication for exproving effectiveness of enterprises cooperation innovation.

关 键 词：高技术企业联盟 所有权配置 动态博弈 西门子通信集团 华为技术有限公司 

分 类 号：F204[经济管理—国民经济]