不对称信息下政府监管者对输配电市场的管制效果分析  

Effect of government supervisor′s regulation on transmission and distribution markets under asymmetric information

作　　者：赵会茹[1] 秦志强[1] 

机构地区：[1]华北电力大学工商管理学院,北京102206

出　　处：《华东电力》2009年第12期1970-1974,共5页East China Electric Power

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(06BJY025)

摘　　要：针对输配电市场的特性,构建了输配电市场的价值流向模型;运用该模型,分析了不对称信息下,政府监管者不实施监督检查以获取企业成本信息,以期望社会剩余最大化为目标对输配电市场实施监管的效果;利用混合策略纳什均衡原理,分析了输配电市场政府监管者为了防止企业虚报成本,实施监督检查的概率及在该混合策略纳什均衡下的监管的期望效果;并进行了具体的算例分析。Based on the characteristics of the transmission and distribution market,a model of value flow of the market was established.It was then used to analyze the effect of government regulator′s regulation aiming at maximizing social surplus expectation when the government regulator does not carry out cost inspection.Also,the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium was applied to analyzing the cost regulation probability of the government regulator to prevent enterprises from false cost reporting,as well as the expected regulation effect. Calculation examples were also conducted.

关 键 词：输配电市场 管制效果 价值流向 不对称信息 博弈 

分 类 号：F407.61[经济管理—产业经济]