短生命周期产品供应链协调动态激励研究  

The study on dynamic incentive of supply chain coordination for short-life-cycle products

作　　者：贾洪飞[1] 卢守权[1] 

机构地区：[1]吉林大学交通学院,吉林长春130042

出　　处：《物流工程与管理》2010年第1期83-85,共3页Logistics Engineering and Management

基　　金：交通部西部交通建设科技项目(项目编号:200439881961)

摘　　要：为了解决短生命周期产品供应链协调的特殊性问题,文中采用博弈理论分析了供应链系统的多周期激励协调问题,从理论上给出了系统协调的最终结果:供应链系统最终处于平衡状态。应用马尔可夫决策过程建立了短生命周期产品供应链协调动态激励模型,实现了有限时段供应链系统多周期总体收益最大。通过数值分析,得到了供应链系统动态激励的帕累托最优策略。动态激励深入挖掘了供应链系统的潜能,在现有文献关注的激励内容的基础上,着重解决了激励过程,从而实现了供应链系统协调静态和动态激励的有机结合。To solve the special problem of supply chain coordination for short-life-cycle products, the multi period incentive problem of the supply chain system coordination is analyzed by adopting the game theory in the paper. The final coordination result of the supply chain system coordination is given theoretically and the supply chain system is in the state of equilibrium. The dynamic incentive model of supply chain coordination for short life-cycle products is established by applying markov decision process and the overall and most profit of finite-interval supply chain system is realized in multi-period. By numerical analysis, the optimalitypolicy for the dynamic coordinationofthe supplychain is attained. The potential of the supply chain system is deeply mined by dynamic incentive. On the basis of the incentive content in the existing paper concerned, the paper lays emphasis on solving the incentive process. Thereby, the organic combination of static and dynamic incentive is realized in the supply chain system coordination.

关 键 词：短生命周期产品 供应链协调 信息不对称 激励理论 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F273