控制性股东侵占行为及其负外部性研究  

Study on expropriation behavior and negative externality of controlling shareholders

作　　者：贾明[1] 张喆[2] 万迪昉[2] 

机构地区：[1]西北工业大学管理学院,西安710072 [2]西安交通大学管理学院,西安710049

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2010年第1期70-77,共8页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70572039);西安交通大学“985工程”二期资助项目(07200701)

摘　　要：如何保护投资者利益免受侵害和提高资本市场效率是在转型经济背景下中国公司治理、产权制度以及金融市场改革过程中亟待解决的关键问题之一.然而,控制性股东主导的公司治理中,相对于"控制性股东监督效应"而言,"控制性股东侵占效应"是占优均衡.控制权私人收益的排他性使得侵占行为同时具有很强的负外部性.解决问题的关键在于通过动态配置决策权来建立有效的制衡机制优化公司治理机制以实现利益相关者间的互惠相容.During the reforming processes of corporate governance, property rights mechanism and financial markets, how to protect the interests of investors and improve the efficiency of capital markets in China is one of the key issues that must be resolved. However, compared with ＂ controlling shareholders＇ monitoring effect＂, the ＂controlling shareholders＇ expropriation effect＂ is dominated in the firms controlled by control- ling shareholders. The exclusivity of private benefits of control rights makes the expropriation generating great negative externality. The key point to solve this problem is through dynamic allocation of control rights to build up a balanced corporate governance mechanism in order to achieve reciprocity-compatiblity between shareholders.

关 键 词：控制权私人收益 负外部性 声誉机制 数据模拟 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]