产权结构、存款保险与银行竞争——基于Bertrand模型的研究  

The Structure of Property Right,Deposit Insurance System and Competition among Banks:A Study Based on Bertrand Models

作　　者：高蓓[1] 章元[2] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学金禾经济研究中心 [2]复旦大学中国社会主义市场经济研究中心,200433

出　　处：《经济评论》2010年第1期5-13,共9页Economic Review

基　　金：国家社科基金项目"中国金融自由化进程中的金融安全预警研究"(项目编号:06XJL004);西安交通大学985项目二期工程"开放经济下的中国经济可持续发展战略理论与政策研究"(项目编号:07200701)资助

摘　　要：本文通过比较双头寡占下价格竞争的纯粹寡占模型和混合寡占模型,主要讨论了国有商业银行对存款保险制度的建立是否存在影响,以及不同存款保险制度对国有商业银行经营利润的影响。研究发现:(1)外部风险控制不能完全代替银行内部风险控制。(2)风险调整存款保险制度与固定费率存款保险制度相比,会弱化道德风险,但无法完全避免。(3)当国有商业银行完全追求社会福利最大化时,无论采取固定费率存款保险制度还是风险调整存款保险制度,均不影响国有商业银行的利润。(4)当银行贷款利率和存款保险定价合理时,如果不考虑信息不对称和代理问题,产权结构不影响银行的风险选择。This paper established a Bertrand duopoly model and a Bertrand mixed oligopoly model to analyze how the structure of property right and the deposit insurance system work on the competition among banks. There are four findings. First, deposit insurance system cannot replace the internal risk control of the bank. Second, comparing with the fixed insurance system, risk - related insurance system can weaken the bank＇ s moral hazard, but it cannot eliminate the moral hazard. Third, the sensitivity of probability of success to interest rate in risk - related insurance system is higger than fixed insurance policy. Fourth, when the state - owned bank is assumed to pursuit maximizing the social welfare, the profit of state - owned bank will not be affected with risk - related insurance system or fixed insurance system. Finally, when the deposit rate and deposit insurance premiums are given, and if information asymmetry cannot be consider, the structure of property right has no influence on the probability of success.

关 键 词：产权结构 存款保险 双头寡占 混合寡占 

分 类 号：F832.2[经济管理—金融学] F224