基于风险投资防范串谋的激励模型研究  

Study on the Incentive Model to Prevent and Control Collusion Based on Venture Capital

作　　者：郑君君[1] 许明嫄[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院

出　　处：《武汉大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2010年第1期125-128,共4页Wuhan University Journal：Philosophy & Social Science

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学规划基金(08JA630062)

摘　　要：在一般的组织和机构中几乎都存在着串谋现象,这是造成一个组织激励扭曲、效率低下的根本原因。在风险投资公司——监督人——风险企业家这一组织结构中也存在着串谋问题。因此,有必要根据三者的博弈关系,寻找一个防范串谋的合约。经过对防范串谋规划问题的求解可知,通过提高串谋侦查技术、加大对串谋行为被发现后的处罚力度或者增大监督人与风险企业家之间交易的难度等措施,可以有效防范控制串谋。Collusion almost exists in distorted incentives inefficiency. C the all general organizations and institutions, which can cause ollusion also exists in a three-tier venture capital companysupervisor-venture entrepreneur model. Therefore, it is necessary to look for a collusion-proof contract according to the process of games among them. On the basis of solving the collusion-proof planning problem, we can conclude that collusion can be prevented and controlled efficiently by improving the investigative technique of collusion, and increasing the punishment after collusion has been found and the difficulty of transaction between supervisor and venture entrepreneur.

关 键 词：串谋 风险投资 博弈 

分 类 号：F83[经济管理—金融学]