食品供应链中企业与农户短期合作交易契约设计  

The Design of Incomplete Transaction Contract between Meatpacking Enterprises & Farmers in the Food Supply Chain

作　　者：张春勋[1,2] 刘伟[1] 李录青[2] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院 [2]重庆工商大学经济贸易学院

出　　处：《管理学报》2010年第2期243-247,288,共6页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(04XJY028);科技部国家软科学项目(2004DGQ2D083)

摘　　要：依据食品供应链中企业与农户间的交易特性,在不完全契约理论框架下,建立了双方承诺不再进行协商的短期合作交易契约设计理论模型。研究结论表明,企业的试验代理人地位是保证农户在第一阶段诚实宣告其类型,从而保证双方专用性投资为最优水平的关键,子博弈精炼纳什均衡的主要限制为,企业支付函数必须为单调函数条件才不会说谎。Based on the transaction characteristics between the meatpacking enterprise and farmer in the food supply chain and the incomplete contract theory, the paper constitutes the short-term cooperate transaction contraction model with the hypothesis that the both parties promise not to renegotiate. The conclusions show that the status of enterprises as test-agents is crucial to ensure the farmer to declare his type honestly in order to guarantee the special investment of both the parties optimized, and the limitation of the sub-game refined Nash equilibrium is that the payment function of enterprise must be a monotonous one so that the enterprise can tell the truth.

关 键 词：不完全契约 机制设计 分离均衡 混同均衡 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]