跨区域环境治理中地方政府间的博弈分析  

Game Analysis on Local Governments in Cross-Region Environmental Regulation

作　　者：刘洋[1] 万玉秋[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学环境学院污染控制与资源化研究国家重点实验室,南京210093

出　　处：《环境保护科学》2010年第1期34-36,56,共4页Environmental Protection Science

基　　金："十一五"国家科技支撑计划重点项目(2007BAC16B05)

摘　　要：地方政府作为利益主体面临着经济发展和环境保护的双重压力,在环境事务的合作治理中,为争取自身利益的最大化展开博弈。文章运用博弈论的理论工具,从动态的、微观的角度分析跨区域环境事务中地方政府间的利益博弈过程和理性决策行为,并为区域间环境事务的合作和交流提出合理建议,以期为我国跨区域环境监管制度、机制的建设和完善提供了理论参考。As the main benefits, local governments are faced with the dual pressures of economic development and environmental protection. In ＂the co - operation of environmental matters, they start the game in order to maximize benefits for their own. This paper, using the tool of game theory, is to analyze the course of interest game and rational decision- making behavior among local governments in cross - region environmental affairs from a micro- dynamic perspective, h gives the reasonable proposals to the cooperation and communi- cation in cross - region environmental affairs to provide a theoretical reference to cross - region environmental regulation system and mechanisms in our country.

关 键 词：跨区域 环境治理 博弈 

分 类 号：X322[环境科学与工程—环境工程] O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]