可进入与退出的不对称双寡头投资博弈模型  

An Asymmetrical Duopoly Investment Game Model Based on Exit Option

作　　者：龚利[1,2] 郭菊娥[1,2] 张国兴[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安710049 [2]西安交通大学中科预测研究基地,陕西西安710049

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2010年第1期52-57,共6页Chinese Journal of Management Science

摘　　要：次贷危机告诫人们,对于项目整个生命周期过程,投资商拥有退出项目权利具有重要意义。针对已有双寡头博弈模型文献中未考虑退出情况的不足,假定项目的投资与经营成本不对称,提出了更具现实意义的可退出的不对称双寡头投资博弈模型,给出了不同情况下两投资商的进入与退出最优转换策略,最后结合案例进行计算得出最优转换点数值解,分析了经营成本、价格波动率、垄断优势水平和退出成本因素对前者的影响。In the project investment decision-making process, investors have the right not only to enter the project but also to withdraw from the project. We assume that the project investment and the operating costs are asymmetric, propose a more practical investment model of asymmetric duopoly game model with exit, and give the optimal conversion point. We analyze the impact of operating costs, price volatility, the level of monopoly advantages, exit costs and other factors on the conversion points.

关 键 词：管理科学 投资策略 期权博弈 可退出 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]