卖方边际成本可变的多物品多属性逆向拍卖研究  

Multi-unit Multi-attribute Reverse Auctions with Variable Marginal Costs for Suppliers

作　　者：姚升保[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学工商管理学院,湖北武汉430073

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2010年第1期113-119,共7页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(09YJC630229);国家自然科学基金项目(70771041)

摘　　要：研究卖方边际成本可变的多物品多属性逆向拍卖问题。首先,根据卖方边际成本可变的特点设计了一种多轮逆向拍卖机制;其次,基于近视最佳反应策略的基本假设,分析卖方的投标策略;最后,利用仿真实验方法,研究买方事先公布估价信息对拍卖的影响。基本结果是:本拍卖机制在多数情况下是有效率的;相对买方不公布估价信息的拍卖机制,买方事先公布估价信息的多物品多属性拍卖具有稍差的市场效率,但能够显著地提高拍卖收敛速度。Multi-unit multi-attribute reverse auctions with variable marginal costs for suppliers are studied in this article. Firstly, an iterative auction mechanism is proposed according to the characteristic of variable marginal costs. Secondly, bidding strategies for the suppliers in the proposed mechanism are analyzed based on the assumption of the myopic best response strategies. Thirdly, the simulation experiments are conducted to study the effects of the valuation information, which is declared by the buyer on the auction. Results from numerical experiments show that, the mechanism achieves market efficiency in most instances. Compared to the auction mechanism in which the buyer＇s valuation information is not declared, the mechanism convergences fast but has lower market efficiency.

关 键 词：多属性拍卖 边际成本 投标策略 市场效率 仿真 

分 类 号：F724[经济管理—产业经济]