“掏空”与监督——控股股东与证监会的博弈分析  

"Emptying out" and Supervision:Analysis of Game Playing Between Controlling Shareholders and the Securities Commission

作　　者：覃忠[1] 刘伟涛[1] 罗磊[1] 

机构地区：[1]汕头大学商学院,广东汕头515063

出　　处：《汕头大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2010年第1期89-93,共5页Journal of Shantou University(Humanities and Social Sciences Edition)

摘　　要：不论是过去的股权分置时期,还是现在的全流通时期,中国股票市场存在的"掏空"现象依然严重。大量的实证研究已经证明,通过完善投资者法律保护和加强外部机构的监督作用等措施来约束控股股东的"掏空"行为是有效和必要的,但是从理论模型研究的基础上对该问题进行论述的研究文献却很少见。通过建立证监会与控股股东之间的混合策略博弈模型,从理论模型的基础上分析博弈双方各自将会采取的策略。As well in the stage of equity division in the past, the phenomenon of 'emptying out' is very severe in China’s stock market in the stage of the current full circulation. A large amount of empirical research reveals that it is effective and necessary to restrain the emptying out of the controlling shareholders by optimizing legal protection of the investors and strengthening the supervising role of the outside supervision institutions. However, there is still inadequate research about this issue on the basis of the theoretical model study. This paper tries to set up the game model of mixed strategies between the Securities Commission and the controlling shareholders, and analyzes the strategies adopted respectively by the gaming parties on the basis of the theoretical model.

关 键 词：“掏空” 监督 博弈 

分 类 号：F121.26[经济管理—世界经济]