延迟支付下易损产品供应链订货与价格决策模型  

An Ordering and Pricing Model for the Supply Chain of Deteriorating Items with Permissible Payment Delay

作　　者：苑波[1] 汪传旭[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海海事大学经济管理学院,上海200135

出　　处：《工业工程》2010年第1期25-30,68,共7页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70573068);上海海事大学研究生创新基金资助项目(YC2009015)

摘　　要：考虑由单个供应商和多个相互竞争的零售商所形成的供应链系统,运用Stackelberg博弈模型,以具有一定损耗率的产品为研究对象,建立并求解了此种供应链系统在供应商提供延迟支付条件下的Stackelberg博弈均衡模型。考虑在供应商延迟支付期限给定情况下,零售商订货周期和产品售价的优化决策模型,建立零售商的订货周期和产品售价确定情况下的供应商延迟支付期限决策模型,设计上述模型的迭代求解算法,得到供应链系统的最终均衡解。运用具体算例验证模型的有效性,通过对部分参数的灵敏度分析给出了对各种不同情况下零售商和供应商各自的对策和建议。A deteriorating product supply chain consisting of one supplier and multiple retailers is considered. A Stackelberg game equilibrium model is developed to describe such a system under the assumption that the supplier permits a payment delay. With this model, given the payment delay period, the optimal ordering cycle and sale price can be determined by the retailers. Meanwhile, with the retailers＇ ordering cycle and sale price known, the supplier can determine payment delay period. Then, an iterative algorithm is presented to find the equilibrium solution for the supply chain. A numerical example is given to analyze the effectiveness of the proposed model.

关 键 词：延迟支付 供应链 STACKELBERG博弈 优化 

分 类 号：F253.4[经济管理—国民经济]