网络信息产品交易中信息披露与监管的博弈分析  

Products Traded in the Network Information Disclosure and Supervision of the Game Analysis

作　　者：蒋丽艳[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北师范大学图书馆,吉林长春130024

出　　处：《现代情报》2010年第2期82-85,88,共5页Journal of Modern Information

基　　金：东北师范大学人文社会科学校内青年基金项目(项目编号:07QN027)<数字信息产品市场中的"柠檬问题"研究>阶段性成果之一

摘　　要：目前我国信息产品市场属于无效市场,存在严重的信息不对称现象。究其原因,在于网络信息产品市场存在虚假信息披露现象。通过建立造假与监管的博弈模型,得到了信息企业与监管机构的3个纳什均衡,进一步找到了根治信息造假行为切实可行的办法。并以此为依据,提出建立有效信息产品市场的相应对策。At present China＇s information market, product markets are not valid, there is serious information asymmetry. The reason is that the network information products market exists the phenomenon of false information disclosure. This false and supervision through the establishment of game models, have received information of the three companies and regulatory agencies Nash equilibrium, and further found a radical approach to practical information on acts of fraud. And use it as a basis for the establishment of effective information products market response.

关 键 词：网络信息产品 信息披露 混合战略纳什均衡 对策研究 

分 类 号：F713.36[经济管理—产业经济]