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作 者:程贵孙
出 处:《北京工商大学学报(社会科学版)》2010年第1期27-31,共5页JOURNAL OF BEIJING TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS UNIVERSITY:SOCIAL SCIENCES
基 金:教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目(08JC790036);上海高校选拔培养优秀青年教师科研专项基金"双边市场定价机制的理论分析与公共政策研究"
摘 要:随着零售业集中化趋势不断增强和大型零售商不断涌现,零售商买方势力日益突出。买方势力问题已经受到了理论界和产业界的高度关注。零售商的纵向或横向兼并、由零售商规模所引致的谈判力量以及供应商对零售商的过度经济性依赖,是零售商买方势力形成的主要因素。买方势力所形成的经济效应主要包括对消费者和中小零售商产生负面影响的买方垄断效应和水床效应,以及能够产生正面影响的抗衡效应。对零售商买方势力的政府规制应该着重关注零售商的并购行为、滥用经济依赖性和纵向约束行为。With the ongoing concentration and the emergence of large-scale retail outlets, there has been significant retail buyer power, which has aroused much concern from both theoretical and practical circles. The vertical or horizontal mergers, the bargaining power caused by retailer's size and the suppliers' excessive economic dependency on retailers are the major determinants of retail buyer power. The economic effect of buyer power includes not only monopsony effect and waterbed effect which may bring about a negative effect on consumers and small and medium-sized retailers, but also countervailing effect which can have a positive influence. Government regulation against buyer power should pay more attention to the retailers' mergers, excessive economic dependency and vertical constraints.
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