跨区域污染排污税管理调控模型  

Model for regulation and control with emission tax of transboundary pollution

作　　者：赵文会[1] 高岩[2] 戴天晟[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海电力学院经济与管理学院,上海200090 [2]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2010年第2期221-226,共6页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：上海市哲学社科规划基金(2008EZH001);国家自然科学基金(10671126);上海市教委科研创新项目(09YZ335)

摘　　要：当不对称跨区域污染存在的情况下,自由交易的排污权市场将无法实现社会财富最大化.以电力行业排污权交易市场为例,建立了自由交易的排污权市场以及征收排污税的排污权市场的效益模型并分别讨论了其一阶最优性条件.通过分析认为:中央政府可以在统一分配初始排污权的前提下,设置地方排污税对区域排污权交易系统进行干预,进而纠正市场的无效性.最后作为结论的直接应用和说明,给出了电厂跨区域污染的一个实例分析.A system of tradable permits may be failure when asymmetric transboundary pollution exists. By the case of tradable emission of electricity industry, effect models were provided and first-best optimal conditions were derived on perfect market and the market that emission taxes can be set by local government. Furthermore, this paper showed that under the precondition of distribution initial permits in a unified way, the central authority can influence the effectiveness of region tradable permits system by arranging emission taxes. Finally, as an application and a demonstration of our results, a numerical example of power plans transboundary pollution is given.

关 键 词：排污权交易 初始分配 排污税 跨区域污染 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]