军事威逼博弈分析  

Game Theoretical Analysis of Compellence in Military Affairs

作　　者：向钢华[1] 王永县[2] 

机构地区：[1]第二炮兵指挥学院,湖北武汉430012 [2]清华大学经济管理学院,北京100084

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2010年第1期5-8,共4页Operations Research and Management Science

摘　　要：本文通过构造一种三阶段动态博弈模型,对军事威逼行为进行了形式化分析,得出了在完全信息条件下军事威逼现象不会出现的结论;基于对挑战者与威慑者双边不完全信息条件下军事威逼模型博弈均衡的求解,探讨了军事威逼成功应满足的条件。The paper conducts a formal analysis of eompellence in military affairs, and concludes that the compellence phenomenon can not occur in complete information. The game equilibriums of the eompellenee model with incomplete information of both challenger and the deterer are computed,and the conditions of successful eompellenee are studied.

关 键 词：威逼 威慑 博弈均衡 不完全信息 

分 类 号：E8[军事]